," "restless vanity" and a "reputation for learning greater even than the learning itself"). The particular object of Holmes' and Gray's disparagements was Story's much maligned opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (sanctioning the application of federal common law, rather than state law, in diversity cases concerning "commercial jurisprudence"). Story's low reputation among modern law students has been well summarized by Grant Gilmore, who phrased the issue as a question of "whether [Story] was more stupid than he was wicked, or, alternatively, more wicked than he was stupid." Gilmore, Book Review, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 244, 244 (1971) (reviewing an earlier biography of Story). rable, utterly irreparable m:· this generation, for there is nobody equal to him." 11 .
Newmyer is Professor of
• : · Taney was right. No ·figure of Story's era even roughly compares with him in terms of impact on the American legal system. Plausible cases can be made that one or another of Story's contemporaries or near-contemporaries, including Marshall, were greater judges. 12 But Story was a man· of 'inariy talents and many roles. Lawyer, politician, judge, scholar, teacher, publicist, legislative draftsman, codifier: it is almost impossible to name a law-related role that Story did not at one time in his long career perform, and perform superbly. Miraculously, Newmyer manages t{) present his ~ubject informatively, and even entertainingly, in each of these varied·guises, and to discern in each the common talents and traits that c;ombined in the person of Joseph Story to produce a great life in the law. The result is not the emaciated image of the Brady portrait, still le8s the forlorn figure of popular memory. Instead, Newmyer reveals a remarkable human being of rare accomplishments, whose life and work are aptly summarized in his biographer's becoming sobriquet: "Statesman of the Old Republic." 13 
II
Story was born on September 18, 1779 in Marblehead, Massachusetts, then British North America's sixth-ranking metropolis in population and, in fishing, its first. His father, Elisha, had helped dump tea into Boston Harbor at the very outset of the Revolution and had 11. Roger Taney to Richard Peters, Jr. (Nov. 14, 1845), Richard Peters Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
12. In addition to his ~ndoubted abilities, of course, Marshall had the great advantage of being Chief Justice. As such, he spoke for the Court in many of its greatest pronouncements. Story proved equal to the challenge, however, on those occasions when the opportunity to an- [Vol. 84:846 gues persuasively that Story's life and work must be seen as a "singular commingling of history and biography" (p. 387). He and his generation were located in time and place precisely at the confluence of Enlightenment idealism and Revolutionary pragmatism. His immediate forebears had defied all odds to impose their will upon history. Their children's challenge, amidst the seemingly endless possibilities of the early nineteenth century, was to secure the promise of the Revolution in a way that would endure for those who came after. In these extraordinary circumstances, Story's natural genius blossomed. To quote Newmyer: "Story was great because he captured the unique lawmaking, system-building potential of the early republic" (p. xvi).
To help us in understanding a world so far removed from our own, Newmyer analyzes two concepts central to the thinking of Story and his contemporaries. One was "republicanism." Wisely, Newmyer eschews any attempt to define the term as a narrow creed or monolithic ideology. Rather, he presents it as a "cultural matrix" generated by the Revolution itself, "within which Americans debated questions of government, law, economics, and all else" (p. xvi). There was agreement among participants to the debate that America had been set apart by Providence for a special destiny, but there was furious debate about the nature of that destiny. Popular sovereignty too, at least as distinguished from monarchical rule, was a given, but the nature of popular sovereignty was in no way settled. What were the roles, respectively, of the people and their representatives? Among the people's representatives, what level of government, and within each level which branch or branches, was best suited to govern? In a nation in the process of creating itself, the list of issues to be resolved seemed beyond number. Far from decreeing a solution, the Constitution bequeathed to the post-revolutionary generation by the founders merely marked out the parameters of the debate. And each of the participants' visions, not surprisingly, tended to be framed by his own peculiar "window on America" (p. 117): Virginia for Jefferson, for example; New England for Story. ' On one matter, however, all of the protagonists in the drama that was early nineteenth-century America passionately agreed: each assume9 the preemptive importance of advancing the national destiny, however it might be defined, by every means at the actor's command. For lawyers, as Newmyer carefully explains, the principal means at hand was a second cultural given of Story's age: "legal science." Like republicanism, legal science was vaguely defined. The term had yet to acquire the strongly normative connotation that it has to modem ears. Instead, in the young Republic, legal science "[m]ost often ... meant simply systematic law -the mirror opposite, that is to say, of the haphazard, pluralistic, localized nature of early national jurisprudence" (p. xiv). In this sense, the term might mean little more than clarifying, rationalizing and disseminating the principles of the com-man law as it had evolved, and was evolving, in the United Statesall constrained by the application of neutral, scientific principles of interpretation and development. In short, the aim was well-controlled legal reform. This seems to be the principal sense in which Story, as a republican lawyer, understood legal science. No doubt, this "juristic" dimension of Story's thought was subject, as a purely intellectual exercise, to the dangers of rigidity and dogmatism. But -pace Jefferson! · -Story's preferred approach to the conundrums of legal science was pragmatic and thus attentive to the needs of the society around him. The only difficulty, from the viewpoint of Southern agrarians, was the nature of the society with which Story, by birth, education and professional experience, was familiar. If, as Newmyer demonstrates, Story's law "took its character and spirit from the practical needs of real pea-.. ple," inevitably the foundations of his legal science became "the needs of the business community and the imperatives of the market as he saw them operate in New England" (p. 116). Thus, by improving law through the application of legal science, Story hoped to create a "national commercial Utopia" (p. 378).
All of this explains a good deal. It provides essential background, for example, to an informed understanding of Story's vast output of opinions, both on circuit and in the Supreme Court, during his thirtyfour years on the bench. 20 Typical of Story's early efforts is De Lovio v. Boit, 21 an 1815 circuit court opinion described by Justice Frankfurter as the "classic" American admiralty decision. 22 De Lovio concerned an insurance policy written by Boston businessmen on a Spanish vessel sailing out of Havana to ply the foreign slave trade. The insurers had refused to pay for loss owing to the ship's capture, and had denied federal court jurisdiction over such maritime contracts. Anticipating the arrival of the case from the District CoUrt, which sided with the insurers on the jurisdictional question, Story advised Supreme Court Reporter Henry Wheaton that he would deliver in De Lovio "a very elaborate opinion upon the whole Admiralty jurisdiction as well as over torts and contracts, and [would] review all the common law decisions on this subject." 23 He did. Story's conclusion, buttressed by an exhaustive survey of reported decisions (both at common law and under Continental systems), was that the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, founded on article III, section 2 of the Constitution, rightfully extended to "all maritime contracts ... and to all torts, injuries, and offences, on the high seas, and in ports ... as far 20. Appointed to the Court at age thirty-two (the youngest Justice ever), Story as the ebb and flow of the tide." 2 4 Detailed though Story's scholarship in De Lovio may be, his decision rested not just on history, the Constitution and "juridical logic," but also, as he confes~ed in the conclusion of his opinion, on "national policy" and the:'advantages resulting to the commerce and navigation of the United States, from a uniformity of rules and decisions in all maritime questions .... " 25 De Lovio itself did not fully achieve such uniformity. While conferring broad jurisdiction on the federal courts, it did not oust ~tate court jurisdiction over maritime contracts in general or marine insurance questions in particular; nor did the decision become law beyond the First Circuit, thanks to the parties' failure to appeal Story's ruling to the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, De Lovio was a considerable victory for Story's expansive views; and, in company with similar decisions rendered by Circuit Justice Story during his early years on the bench, it illustrates vividly his determination "to facilitate commercial development" by applying legal science to the facts of life in the marketplace, and the "fusion of scholarship, practicality, and long-range economic calculation in [his] judging" (p. 123).
Swift v. Tyson, 26 decided nearly three decades later but this time in
Story's role as Supreme Court Justice, teaches the same lessons; and a careful reading of the case, as Newmyer demonstrates, does much to redeem the modern-day reputations of both the decision and its author. The issue to be resolved in Swift was relatively narrow: did the Rules of Decision Act, 27 which governed diversity actions, require the federal courts to apply local common law in determining the validity of a negotiable instrument? In a brief opinion by Story, the Court held that the transfer of a bill of exchange in order to discharge the transferor's preexistent debt rendered the transferee a holder in due course despite defects that might have destroyed the value of the bill as between the original parties thereto -and this, notwithstanding the pos- . , That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall.otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law iv ¢e courts of the United States in cases where they apply.
sibility that New York law, as established by the courts of that state, was otherwise. Story's opinion rested on his distinction between "state laws strictly local" and "general commercial law." The former, he said, consisted of "rights and titles to things having a permanent locality" (mainly real estate) and was evinced by state statutes and judicial constructions thereof. In these local matters, federal diversity courts were bound by state law. Not so, however, with respect to "contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature," which Story considered "not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation." As to those matters, the federal courts could and should make up their own minds, based on "the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." 28 In its time, Swift was hardly a controversial decision: on the issue actually decided, Story spoke for a unanimous Court, 29 and his opinion was barely noticed by contemporary newspapers and periodicals. 30 After the Civil War, of course, the Court expanded the category of general commercial law created in Swift ·to encompass a variety of other matters, including municipal bonds and torts. 3 I Story himself can hardly be charged with those follies. 32 Still less should he be pilloried for having rendered, in his dotage, an "unconstitutional" decision. 33 Cooley and others, went through five American editions and remained in print through the turn of the century. In addition, the Commentaries were enthusiastically received by scholars and it. 41 As Newmyer's thorough analysis demonstrates, the commentaries were more than a tour de force of learning and technique. 42 They were also interrelated and integral parts of Story's "grand effort to create an American commercial common law suitable both to the needs of the new capitalism and to the values of old republicanism" (p. 282). As applied law, they were eminently successful. Newmyer admiringly calls them "working law for working lawyers" (p. 303). The practicing bar obviously agreed: altogether, Story's eight volumes on private law went through seventy-one editions, many of them remaining in circulation for a half-century after their first publication. · Many of Story's readers, of course, were his own former students at Harvard Law School, who had also been the first auditors of the commentaries in lecture form. Story's efforts in imagining and bringing into being the first "national" law school are too well known to require repetition here. 43 What is important for present purposes is the complete coincidence that existed between Story's Harvard reforms and the purposes that animated him in his other roles. As Story's influence on the Court waned during the last decade and a half of his life, he embraced his duties at the Law School in the fervent hope that, at Harvard, he could employ scientific law to train scientific judges in England, Scotland, Germany and France -with translations into French, Spanish and Portuguese.
Story's first edition was notable, in particular, for its "Concluding Remarks,'' in which his republican fire shone with special brilliance:
If these Commentaries shall but inspire in the rising generation a more ardent love of their country, an unquenchable thirst for liberty, and a profound reverence for the constitution and the Union, then they will have accomplished all, that their author ought to desire. Let the American youth never forget, that they possess a noble inheritance, bought by the toils, and sufferings, and blood of their ancestors; and capable, if wisely improved, and faithfully guarded, of transmitting to their latest posterity all the substantial blessings of life, the peaceful enjoyment of liberty, property, religion, and independence. The structure has been erected by architects of consummate skill and fidelity; its foundations are solid; its compartments are beautiful, as well as useful; its arrangements are full of wisdom and order; and its defences are impregnable from without. It has been reared for immortality, if the work of man may justly aspire to such a title. It may, nevertheless, perish in an hour by the folly, or corruption, or negligence of its only keepers, THE PEOPLE.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 759-60.
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS (1832); COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-FLICT OF LAWS (1834); COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1836); COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS (1838); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (1839); COMMEN-TARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (1841); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE (1843); COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES (1845)
. Story died before completing his grand survey of American jurisprudence with planned commentaries on admiralty and maritime law. P. 381.
42. Truth to tell, the commentaries have not escaped criticism as verbose, tedious, diffuse, eclectic -or worse. But even Holmes, who at times had harsh words for Story's scholarship, acknowledged that, on the whole, he had "done more than any other English-speaking man [of [Vol. 84:846 lawyers, whose sound learning and solid common sense might save the Republic from the dangers of democratic excess. How well he succeeded is a matter subject to debate, but the impact of his vision is not. By the final year of Story's life, Harvard had truly become, in the words of Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's April 1845 1 report to the Harvard Corporation, "[a]n American law school." 44 Like his friend Story, to whom he gave the lion's share of the credit, Shaw saw the revitalized law school as a union of educated young men ... who afterwards distribute over all the United States, may be expected to have conspicuous and influential places in Society, and may be looked to as a means of Union and harmony tending to the advancement of the common and general interests of the whole people. 45 If the old Judge himself smiled on reading Shaw's vision of the new Harvard, no doubt he had earned the pleasure.
Story's accomplishments in his many other legal roles -as publicist, 4 6 legislative draftsman 47 and codifier, 48 for example -defy retelling in brief compass. In all of his roles, however, Story's purpose 47. As early as 1812, Story had drawn up and forwarded to Attorney General William Pinkney a "sketch" for an improved federal criminal code. P. 103. In his middle years, his projects included a national bankruptcy act, which he drafted and which his ally, Daniel Webster, promoted in Congress. P. 172. And shortly before his death, at the request of the Senate Judiciary Committee and with the approval of the Court, Story prepared an act, subsequently codified at 5 Stat. 726 (1845), extending federal jurisdiction over inland waters to federally licensed vehicles employed in interstate commerce. P. 208.
48. Story believed in what might be called "moderate codification." He was no Benthamite; nor did he oppose codification altogether. His theory of codification was perhaps best exempli· fied in his 1825 exchange ofletters with Henry Wheaton concerning the latter's responsibilities as a revisor of New York's statute laws. Wheaton had described the project to Story as "fill[ing] up the lacunae" left by the legislature in certain areas and "simplifying the practice" in others, rather than as a wholesale revision of existing law. Henry Wheaton to Joseph Story (Sept. 19, 1825), Henry Wheaton Papers, The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York City. In his response, Story urged that the New York revisors codify the common law itself, or "at least the part which is most reduced to principles & is of daily extensive application." Story's theory was not that the legislature should create principles oflaw, but that it might clarify and refine those that had been was constant: to bring consistent, carefully conceived legal principles to bear in resolving the great political and economic problems of his own generation, and so to safeguard the precious inheritance bequeathed to it by those who made the Revolution.
For much of Story's career, his purpose and style suited perfectly the needs of the age. America was young and abuilding. " [Story' s] cry for national institutions," Newmyer writes, "was commensurate with the dream of national greatness" (p. 114); and his prescriptions for greatness, by and large, worked remarkably well. Toward the end of his life, however, it became painfully and inescapably clear, to Story and to his generation, that republicanism and legal science were incapable of curing one grievous ill of the body politic, an ill that was also, ironically, a legacy of the framers whom Story so much revered. The debilitating disease in question was slavery. Story's deep personal aversion to slavery, evidenced from his earliest days on the bench, is beyond doubt. 49 But the Constitution itself, that bulwark of republican liberty, unflinchingly acknowledged the existence of human bondage in article I, section 2, clause 3 (the three-fifths clause), and provided in article IV, section 2, clause 3 (the rendition clause) that persons "held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another ... shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due." Much as he himself abhorred slavery, Story recognized these appalling provisions for what they were: the crucial compromise between slaveholding and free states that had made the Union possible. They were, moreover, the law of the land, which he as a judge was sworn to uphold -and, with them, the measures adopted by Congress for their implementation.
Story's discomfort in deciding Prigg v. Pennsylvania 50 can readily be imagined. His health had already begun to fail by 1842, 51 and he knew that his remaining years on the Court must be few. An opinion sustaining the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was bound to be condemned in the North and particularly in New England, a region whose values Story had long embodied and sought to spread throughout the nation. Nonetheless, in a forceful opinion employing by now familiar techniques of reasoning, he concluded that the Act must be upheld -but also that the extradition of fugitive slaves lay exclusively within the 49. In his circuit court charges, which were printed and circulated throughout New England, Story attacked slavery directly. See, e.g., the charge to the grand jury quoted in 1 LIFE AND LETIERS, supra note 1, at Was the result in Prigg, then, a "triumph of freedom," as Story is
reported by his son to have insisted "repeatedly and earnestly" to family and friends? 54 Newmyer thinks not, and suggests that Story's opinion, taken as a whole, "was influenced more by his fear of abolition than by his desire to free fugitive slaves" (p. 377). Indeed, Newmyer doubts that Story had any grand strategy in mind in constructing the opinion, conjectures that he agreed reluctantly to write on behalf of the majority, and concludes that, in the end, his overriding objective was simply to preserve the constitutional compromise on slavery that he saw as the last barrier against dissolution of the Union. That assessment, although incapable of conclusive proof, rings true. Story's dark forebodings concerning the future of the Republic, and his sober awareness of the limitations and responsibilities of judicial office, were eloquently manifested in his remarks to the students of Harvard Law School as the year 1843 drew to a close. In discussing the painful necessity, under the Constitution, of returning fugitive slaves to their masters, he observed:
If one part of the country may disregard one part of the Constitution, another section may refuse to obey that part which seems to bear hard upon its interests, and thus the Union will become a "mere rope of sand"; and the Constitution, worse than a dead letter, an apple of discord in our midst, a fruitful source of reproach, bitterness, and hatred, and in the end discord and civil war [T]he slightest attention to the history of the national constitution must satisfy every reflecting mind, how many difficulties attended its formation and adoption, from real or imaginary differences of interests, sectional feelings, and local institutions. It is an attempt to create a national sovereignty, and yet to preserve the state sovereignties; though it is impossible to assign definite boundaries in every case to the powers of each. The influence of the dis-Barely a year later, Story quietly informed family and close friends of his determination shortly to leave the Court, having concluded sadly "that by remaining on the Bench I could accomplish no good, either for myself or for my country." 56 He died, still in harness, on September 10, 1845, grateful for his own "prosperity and success ... in life" 57 but powerless at last to spare the old Republic from the darkness of the onrushing night.
III
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic is an unmitigated success. This exemplary biography is the first thoroughgoing study of Story's intellectual life, and as such succeeds brilliantly in conveying both the main influences on Story's thought and the principal themes in his work. Along the way, however, Newmyer manages also to present a fascinating portrait of Story's world. This is Story's biography, yes; but it is the biography of an age as well. Name a leading figure or vital issue of the early nineteenth century and, virtually without exception, he, she or it will appear in these pages. Each is deftly summarized and sketched; all are accorded scrupulously fair treatment by a master historian. 58 Newmyer should, and one trusts will, receive a variety of honors for this volume. It is the product of painstaking and unprecedented research. It is carefully conceived, illuminating, rich in detail, and entertainingly written. 59 It is absolutely first-rate. What elements must concur to produce a biography of this calibre? Opinions will differ. A partial list, however, might include: talent, [Vol. 84:846 obviously, on the part of the biographer, and hard work, too; copious and available data; a subject who is significant, interesting, and perhaps underappreciated or even misunderstood in the modem age; and, at least ideally, a good "fit" between biographer and subject. The lastnamed factor, one suspects, was especially important in the present instance. The very first words of Newmyer's story record the following tale:
Some years ago, as I sat pondering the Crowninshield papers at the Peabody Museum in Salem, Massachusetts, an old man sat down across the table from me. He desperately needed a shave and, in truth, looked totally down, out, and bedraggled. He fixed me with a disconcerting stare for some time before asking ifl were the person working on Joseph Story. I confessed my presumption, whereupon he fired several remarkably informed questions at me that led me to conclude that he was an unfrocked history professor-or perhaps a crashed biographer of Judge Story. Having queried me and found me wanting, not to say speechless, he rose abruptly. "Young man," he said with a grim intensity as he turned to leave, "studying Joseph Story could ruin your career!" [p. ix] Clearly, Newmyer's career has survived his prolonged meditation on the old Judge, and even prospered, deservedly, as a result of it. Newmyer is a generous man. Besides the old fellow at the Peabody, he shares credit in his Acknowledgments with innumerable libraries, archives, historical societies, foundations and publications, and no fewer than thirty-nine named individuals, who have helped him along the way in completing this superb biography. But Newmyer does not stop there, nor could he. In his Introduction, he adds thanks to one final individual who has been his companion, on a daily basis, for almost thirty years: "I confess a strange sense of gratitude," Newmyer writes, "to the old judge for being such a demanding teacher and such good company" (p. xiii). Story, wherever he may be now, should be grateful also. Biographers, no less than their subjects, are revealed by what they have written. In Kent Newmyer, the old Judge has had an apt pupil -and, one suspects, good company, too.
